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Abstract
This paper develops a search model with heterogeneous workers and social networks.
High ability workers are more productive and have a larger number of professional contacts.
Firms have a choice between a high cost vacancy in the regular labour market and a low cost
job opening in the referral market. In this setting the model predicts that a larger number of
social contacts is associated with a larger wage gap between high and low ability workers and
a larger difference in the equilibrium unemployment rates. Next we demonstrate that the
decentralized equilibrium is inefficient for any value of the bargaining power. There are two
reasons for the inefficiency. First, the private gain from creating a job in the referral market
is always below the social gain, so the equilibrium unemployment of high ability workers is
above its optimal value. Moreover, high ability workers congest the market for low ability
workers, so the equilibrium wage inequality is inefficiently large. This is in contrast to the
result of Blazquez and Jansen (2008) showing that the distribution of wages is compressed
in a search model with heterogeneous workers. Finally, we show that a combination of taxes
and subsidies can restore the optimal allocation.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate social welfare and optimal policy in a search model
with heterogeneous workers. In our model workers differ with respect to their productivity
(high and low ability workers) and the structure of social networks, in particular, there is a
positive correlation between ability and the number of professional contacts. In this setting,
when both types of workers are mixed in the regular labour market, the decentralized equilibrium
is inefficient as high ability workers congest the market for workers with low abilities. Moreover,
this inefficiency is increasing in the number of social contacts and is associated with a larger wage
gap between the two groups of workers. This finding questions the traditional view that social
contacts increase efficiency by mitigating the problem of adverse selection (see Montgomery
(1991)). It is also different from the literature on heterogeneous worker groups where wages are
generally compressed when two types of workers are simultaneously searching for jobs in the
same labour market (see Blazquez and Jansen (2008)).
There is strong empirical evidence that 30 − 60% of new hires find jobs through personal
contacts (see for example Staiger (1990), Granovetter (1995), Pistaferri (1999), Kugler (2003),
Pelizarri (2010), Bentolila et. al. (2010) for different countries). In addition, Hensvik and Skans
(2013) report that incumbent workers with a high test score are more likely to be linked to the
new hires than low ability employees. In particular, in their data firms rely on referrals from
high-ability workers in order to attract applicants with higher unobserved ability. To incorporate
these empirical findings into the model and keep it tractable we assume that only high ability
workers are linked in a network and have the same exogenous number of professional contacts
who can give a reference for the job. In contrast, low ability workers are restricted to search for
jobs in the regular labour market. Therefore there is a tight connection in the model between
the productivity of the worker and the amount of social capital.
The choice of search methods by firms is endogenous. When deciding to enter the labour
market, firms face a trade-off between a high cost vacancy in the regular job market and a low
cost job opening in the referral market. The pool of job applicants in the regular labour market
is mixed as both types of unemployed workers apply for the publicly advertised positions. On
the contrary, the pool of applicants in the referral market is limited to unemployed workers with
high ability as only these workers are connected in a network. Therefore, the cost difference
between the markets is explained by the necessity to screen the applicants. This assumption is
in line with the original idea of Montgomery (1991) that workers hired through social networks
are, on average, more productive and the formal channel of search is more expensive for firms.
Due to screening, firms in the regular market are informed about the productivity of the
applicant. Thus it is natural to assume that wages are negotiated ex-post between the firm
and the applicant by means of Nash-bargaining. Equilibrium is determined by two free-entry
conditions in the regular and the referral market. Depending on the parameters, there are two
types of equilibria. If the number of social contacts is low it is not optimal for firms to rely solely
on referrals. Therefore there exists a unique equilibrium without referrals where both types of
workers are mixed in the regular labour market. In contrast, if the number of social contacts
is sufficiently large, then some firms save on the screening cost and use referrals in the hiring
process. This is the equilibrium with two channels of job search.
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High-ability workers are better paid than low ability workers. On the one hand high ability
workers are more productive which leads to higher wages. On the other hand, their reservation
wages are high due to the additional possibility of finding jobs through the network of contacts.
In this setting, the model predicts that a larger number of social contacts puts an upward
pressure on wages of high ability workers and reduces the equilibrium unemployment of these
workers. Low ability workers are negatively effected: their wages fall and the unemployment rate
is increased. This implies that a more intensive use of referrals is associated with an increased
wage dispersion between the two groups of workers. Thus a more important role of social
networks in the modern society provides an additional explanation for the increased income
inequality in the United States in the recent decade. Next our model predicts that the decision
of firms to use referrals may be inefficient from a social perspective. The job-filling rate in the
referral market does not depend on the number of other informal vacancies in this market. It
is rather that the hiring probability depends on the architecture of the social network. So firms
hiring through referrals do not impose a negative search externality on other firms which is the
case in the regular market. From a social perspective this means that vacancies in the referral
market should be created up to the point where the expected cost of an open position is equal
to the expected surplus of a filled job. In contrast, in the decentralized equilibrium firms start
using referrals at the point where the expected cost is equal to the expected profit. This means
that the optimal threshold number of contacts which is necessary for firms to use referrals is
lower than the minimum number of contacts in the decentralized economy. In the paper we
show that this inefficiency may be mitigated by means of employment subsidies in the referral
market. In reality such subsidies can take the form of referral bonuses which are reimbursed by
the state.
Finally, we identify a pooling inefficiency in the regular labour market. High ability workers
are more productive but they also bargain a higher wage. Which of these two effects is dominat-
ing for profits strongly depends on the productivity difference between workers and the number
of social contacts. If the productivity (wage) effect is dominating then the expected profit of
firms in the regular market is increasing (decreasing) in the proportion of high ability workers.
In a numerical example we show that the effect of higher wages is dominating already for a small
number of social contacts and therefore high ability workers impose a negative externality on
low ability workers. This effect generates an equilibrium wage dispersion which is inefficiently
large. The optimal policy in this case is associated with increasing (decreasing) the reservation
wage of low (high) ability workers and reducing the equilibrium inequality in wages. Moreover,
we show that this pooling inefficiency is an artefact of referrals and does not exist in the labour
market without social contacts.
This paper is closely related to the literature on heterogeneous workers and social networks.
Albrecht and Vroman (2002) is the first study analysing an economy with skill differences across
workers and varying skill requirements of firms. Gautier (2002) extends their framework to
allow for on-the-job search and Blazquez and Jansen (2008) analyse welfare in a model economy
of Albrecht and Vroman (2002). Our comparative static result is similar to the one reported
in Gautier (2002), namely that mixing two types of workers in the same labour market may
congest the market for low ability workers and their unemployment may increase with a higher
proportion of high ability workers. One deviation is that we do not consider the possibility of
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on-the-job search, instead the focus of our paper is on social welfare and policy, these issues are
not addressed in Gautier (2002).
From the perspective of welfare our paper is close to Blazquez and Jansen (2008). They
find that wage bargaining when agents are matched at random compresses the wage distribution
relative to workers’ shadow values and doesn’t lead to the efficient outcome. This means that
low (high) ability workers receive more (less) in the decentralized equilibrium than in the socially
efficient allocation. We show that this situation is a special case of our model when productivity
differences are large and the number of social contacts is small. However, when the number
of social contacts is moderate the direction of inefficiency is reversed and the gap in wages is
inefficiently large. This is the situation we report in a benchmark model of our paper.
Other related studies include Sattinger (1995) and Shimer and Smith (2001). The purpose
of the former study is to show that the uncoordinated matching decisions of agents may give rise
to multiple equilibria with inefficient matching sets. Shimer and Smith (2001) reach a stronger
conclusion. They consider a model with endogenous search intensity decisions and show that
the equilibrium is never efficient because bargaining distorts the marginal returns from search.
Finally, Shi (2002) and Shimer (2005a) also develop a model of directed search in which jobs
attract applications from several types of workers. However, in their models the allocation is
always efficient because firms can commit to the posted wage offers.
From the perspective of social networks our study is most closely related to Cahuc and
Fontaine (2009) and Zaharieva (2013). Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) restrict workers to choose
between the two job search methods, so in their model, decentralized decisions by workers and
firms to use networks can suffer from a coordination failure. On the contrary, the choice of search
methods is not limited in our model and thus both search channels are simultaneously used by
high ability workers to find a job. Zaharieva (2013) considers a matching model with family
networks and wage posting and examines welfare in this model. Wage posting and directed
search lead to the ex-ante separation of unemployed workers in the regular labour market.
Consequently the decentralised equilibrium is constrained efficient.
Early economic studies on social contacts include Montgomery (1991, 1992, 1994) and
Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). The focus of Montgomery (1991) is on the effect of asymmet-
ric information on wage inequality in the presence of the ”inbreeding bias”, implying clustering
of workers with respect to their ability type. As a result the equilibrium is characterized by the
positive correlation between ability and wages. Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) consider the
population of workers differing with respect to the probability of receiving job offers through
personal contacts, they show that wages paid in jobs obtained through personal contacts are
more likely to be higher than wage offers obtained through a direct application. This conclusion
is questioned in the recent empirical literature, and moreover, ”both the models of Montgomery
(1991) and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) ignore what may be the most important role for
network: to increase the job offer arrival rate.”(p. 7, Margolis and Simonnet (2003)).
Recent theoretical studies emphasizing the positive effect of referrals on wages include Kugler
(2003) and Galenianos (2012). Specifically, Kugler (2003) finds that the benefit of using referrals
for firms is that they lower monitoring costs, because workers can exert peer pressure on co-
workers. As a result, firms relying on referrals find it cheaper to elicit effort by paying efficiency
wages than firms using formal hiring methods. Galenianos (2012) extends the original idea of
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Montgomery (1991) and shows a positive link between the intensity of referrals and the job
finding rate. Other studies investigating the link between referrals and the job-finding rate are
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007) as well as Fontaine (2004, 2007, 2008). A larger
overview of this literature can be found in Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains notation and the general economic
environment. Section 3 deals with the existence of the decentralized equilibrium. Section 4
contains welfare analysis of the decentralized equilibrium. Section 5 illustrates our theoretical
results by means of a numerical example, while section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a unit mass of infinitely
lived risk neutral workers and an endogenous number of firms, both workers and firms discount
the future at rate r. Workers are ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their ability and social
capital. Let µ denote the fraction of low ability workers, once employed these workers produce
the flow output y0. The fraction of high ability workers is 1−µ, these workers are more productive
and generate the flow output y1 > y0 when employed. To simplify the model we assume that low
ability workers do not have professional contacts, in contrast high ability workers have an equal
number of professional contacts l > 0. This assumption reflects the positive correlation between
worker’s ability and the number of contacts in the labour market who are willing to refer this
worker to the potential employer. Workers can be either employed and producing output or
unemployed and searching for a job. Let u1 and u0 denote the total numbers of unemployed
workers with high and low ability, so that u ≡ u0+u1. Unemployed workers enjoy the flow value
of leisure z.
Every firm entering the labour market can choose between a high cost vacancy in the regular
submarket and a low cost job opening in the referral submarket. The corresponding flow costs
of open vacancies are denoted by c + p and c. The flow cost p here is an additional screening
cost in the regular labour market. Since the outcome of screening is a perfect signal about the
applicant’s productivity there is no problem of asymmetric information in the model.
Further, let v and v2 be the numbers of vacancies in the two submarkets respectively. Due to
the absence of social contacts workers with low ability are restricted to search in the regular job
market. On the contrary, high ability workers can simultaneously search in both submarkets.
This means that high and low ability workers are mixed in the regular job market so that firms
don’t know the type of a worker until the meeting takes place. The matching function in the
regular job market is then given by m(u, v), and the market tightness is θ = v/u. This matching
function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments, unemployment and vacancies, concave,
and exhibiting constant returns to scale. Therefore, the job finding rate λ(θ) and the vacancy
filling rate q(θ) in the regular job market are given by:
q(θ) = m(u, v)/v = mθ−η λ(θ) = θq(θ) = mθ1−η
where 0 < η < 1 is the elasticity of the job filling rate.
Matching function in the referral job market is based on a simplified urn-ball matching process
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(e.g. Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2003), Cahuc and Fontaine (2009)), in which every high
ability worker has an urn and every job offer is a ball which is sent into urns. First, firms with
open vacancies contact high ability employees at rate a per unit time. Second, every employee
transmits vacancy information to exactly one randomly chosen unemployed social contact out
of a pool of l contacts. Here we assume that job information is only transmitted to the direct
social links, so the job offer is lost if all l contacts are employed. The matching function in the
referral job market is therefore equal to m1(u1, v2) = av2[1− (1−
u1
1−µ)
l]. The term in brackets is
the probability to meet an employee with at least one unemployed social contact (as (1− u11−µ)
l
is the probability that all l contacts are employed). Therefore this matching function can be
understood as the number of vacancies in the referral job market sent to the employees with at
least one unemployed contact at rate a. The job finding rate λ2 and the vacancy filling rate q2
in the referral job market are given by:
q2 = m1(u1, v2)/v2 = a[1− (1−
u1
1− µ
)l] λ2 = m1(u1, v2)/u1 = av2[1− (1−
u1
1− µ
)l]/u1
Any job can be destroyed for exogenous reasons with a Poisson destruction rate δ. Upon a
separation the worker becomes unemployed and the firm may open a new job.
3 The decentralized equilibrium
3.1 Bellman equations
Let Ui, i = 0, 1 denote the present values of being unemployed and, similarly, Wi, i = 0, 1, 2 – the
present values of being employed. The subindex 0 refers to low ability workers. The subindex 1
refers to high ability workers obtaining jobs in the regular market, while the subindex 2 stands
for the present values of workers finding jobs in the referral market. The structure of the labour
market is illustrated in figure 1. In addition, let variables τ0 and τ1 denote the flow values of
transfers that unemployed workers receive from the public budget. The present values U0 and
U1 for the unemployed can be written as:
rU0 = z + τ0 + λ(θ)(W0 − U0) rU1 = z + τ1 + λ(θ)(W1 − U1) + λ2(W2 − U1) (1)
where the latter equation incorporates the fact that high ability workers can simultaneously
search for jobs in both submarkets. The present values Wi for the employed are given by:
rW0 = w0 − δ(W0 − U0) rWi = wi − δ(Wi − U1), i = 1, 2 (2)
Next consider firms and let Ji, i = 0, 1, 2 denote the present values of profits. Bellman equations
for filled jobs are then given by:
rJi = yi − wi − δJi, i = 0, 1 rJ2 = y1 − w2 − δJ2 (3)
Further, we describe firms with open vacancies. In the regular labour market, let γ = u0/u
denote the probability for the firm to meet a low ability worker, so that 1 − γ = u1/u is the
probability to meet a high ability worker. Besides, let s denote the flow values of transfers that
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Figure 1: Labour market flows
firms in the referral market obtain from the public budget. For example, these transfers can
cover the traveling expenses of job applicants and the costs of accommodation at the place of
the job interview. In the next section we consider the optimal policy of the social planner, so the
vector of policy instruments {τ0, τ1, s} will allow the social planner to affect wages and the job
creation. The present values of open vacancies V and V2 in the regular and the referral market
respectively can then be written as:
rV = −(c+ p) + q(θ)(γJ0 + (1− γ)J1 − V ) rV2 = −c+ s+ q2(J2 − V2) (4)
where the term γJ0+(1−γ)J1 is the expected present value of firm profits in the regular labour
market. In the following we investigate the economy in the steady state. Hence, the equilibrium
unemployment for both types of workers reads:
u0λ(θ) = δ(µ − u0) u1(λ(θ) + λ2) = δ(1 − µ− u1) (5)
Each of these equations implies that the inflow of workers into unemployment (on the right-hand
side) is equal to the outflow of workers from this state (on the left-hand side). It is easy to see
therefore that u0 decreases in θ and that workers with low ability face a higher equilibrium
unemployment rate: u0/µ > u1/(1 − µ).
The steady state conditions (5) allow us to express the equilibrium probability of being in
contact with a low ability worker in the following way:
γ ≡
u0
u0 + u1
=
µ(δ + λ(θ) + λ2)
δ + λ(θ) + µλ2
=
δµ
δµ + (δ + λ(θ))u1
This means that γ(θ, u1) is decreasing in both θ and u1. Intuitively, a higher market tightness
θ reduces the equilibrium unemployment of low ability workers u0, so the probability that a
randomly chosen applicant is of low ability is decreasing in θ. Similarly, more high-skilled
unemployed workers u1 reduce the chances of meeting a low ability worker. Finally, note that
γ > µ in the presence of social contacts, while γ = µ otherwise. Networks reduce unemployment
of high ability workers, so in the equilibrium with social contacts firms are less likely to meet
these workers in the regular market: (1− γ) < (1 − µ). Next section investigates existence and
uniqueness of the decentralized equilibrium with social contacts.
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3.2 Wage determination and the free-entry conditions
This section investigates the labour market without policy instruments (τ0 = τ1 = s = 0). Both
the efficient resource allocation and the optimal policy are later addressed in section 4.
The equilibrium wages are determined by means of Nash bargaining. When bargaining over
w0 unemployed low ability workers act to maximize the total job rent W0 − U0 which is an
increasing function of w0. Similarly, unemployed high ability workers act to maximize the rent
Wi − U1, where the subindex i takes values 1 or 2 depending on the type of search channel.
Firms are maximizing the surplus value Ji, i = 0, 1, 2 so the rent sharing conditions become:
J0 =
(1− β)
β
(W0 − U0) Ji =
(1− β)
β
(Wi − U1), i = 1, 2 (6)
where we impose the free-entry conditions V = V2 = 0, therefore in the equilibrium firms are
indifferent between a formal vacancy in the regular market and an informal vacancy through
referrals. The corresponding wage equations are given by:
w0 = βy0 + (1− β)rU0 w1 = w2 = βy1 + (1− β)rU1 (7)
Denote S0 = J0 +W0 − U0 the total job surplus in a match between a firm and a low ability
worker, similarly let S = Ji +Wi − U1, i = 1, 2 the total job surplus in a match between a firm
and a high ability worker. Note that S is independent of the search channel, so that J1 = J2
and W1 = W2. This is because bargaining is an ex-post wage setting mechanism so the sunk
costs of open vacancies are not directly reflected in wages. Surplus values S0 and S are given by
the following system of equations:
S0(θ) =
y0 − z
r + δ + βλ(θ)
S(u1) =
y1 − z
r + δ + βδ(1 − µ− u1)/u1
where in the last expression we make use of the steady-state condition λ(θ) + λ2 = δ(1 − µ −
u1)/u1. Intuitively, a higher market tightness θ improves the outside opportunities of low ability
unemployed workers rU0 = z+βλ(θ)S0, so the total job surplus S0(θ) is decreasing in θ. At the
same time, in the equilibrium a higher number of unemployed high ability workers u1 can only
be attributed to a lower job-finding rate λ(θ) + λ2. In this latter case the reservation wage of
high ability workers is also lower rU1 = z + β(λ(θ) + λ2)S, hence the total job surplus S(u1) is
increasing in u1.
The free-entry conditions in each of the two submarkets are then given by:
c
q2(u1)
= (1− β)S(u1)
c+ p
q(θ)
= (1− β)[γ(θ, u1)S0(θ) + (1− γ(θ, u1))S(u1)]
Both of these equations suggest that the expected cost of an open vacancy in the equilibrium
should be equal to the expected present value of profits. Consider first the referral market.
Expression c/q2(u1) is decreasing in u1 since more high ability unemployed workers make it
easier for firms to fill informal vacancies. At the same time a higher unemployment level u1
worsens the bargaining position of workers. This leads to lower wages w2 and higher profits
J2 = (1 − β)S(u1) in the referral market. Consequently the free-entry condition in the referral
market defines a unique equilibrium value of u1 if c/a < (1−β)(y1− z)/(r+ δ). In the following
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we assume that this condition is satisfied. Now consider the regular labour market. The right
hand side of the corresponding free-entry condition is an expected firm profit from an open
vacancy in the regular job market. Indeed, bargaining implies that firms obtain a fraction 1−β
of the total surplus and with probability γ(θ, u1) the firm is in contact with a low ability worker.
Define the equilibrium with social contacts in the following way:
Definition 1. Search equilibrium with social contacts is a vector of variables {U0, U1, Wi, Ji,
V , V2, wi, θ, u1}, i = 0, 1, 2 satisfying the asset value equations for workers (1) and (2), for
firms (3) and (4), the rent-sharing equations (6) as well as the free-entry conditions V = 0 and
V2 = 0.
Further note that existence of the equilibrium with social contacts implies
v2 ≥ 0 ⇔ λ2 ≥ 0 ⇔ λ(θ) ≤ δ(1 − µ− u1)/u1 for a given u1
which imposes an upper bound on the equilibrium market tightness θ. This means that existence
of the equilibrium with referrals is not always guaranteed. Our results concerning this question
are summarized in proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Define λ(θ¯(u1)) ≡ δ(1− µ− u1)/u1. There exists an equilibrium with referrals
if the following condition is satisfied:
Condition A:
c+ p
q(θ¯(u1))
> (1− β)
(µy0 + (1− µ)y1 − z
r + δ + βλ(θ¯(u1))
)
where u1 is determined from the job creation condition in the referral market (JC2):
c
a[1− (1−
u1
1− µ
)l]
=
(1− β)(y1 − z)
r + δ + β(1 − µ− u1)δ/u1
and θ ≤ θ¯(u1) is given by the job creation condition in the regular market (JC):
c+ p
q(θ)
= (1− β)
(γ(θ, u1)(y0 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
+
(1− γ(θ, u1))(y1 − z)
r + δ + β(1− µ− u1)δ/u1
)
Moreover, wage dispersion ∆w = w2 − w0 = w1 −w0 is decreasing in θ and u1.
Proof: Appendix I.
Suppose condition A is satisfied for some l > 0, which means there exists an equilibrium
with referrals. A higher number of social contacts makes information transmission more effi-
cient in the referral market. Therefore the equilibrium unemployment of high ability workers is
unambiguously decreasing in the number of contacts. Moreover in the limiting case l →∞ the
job-filling rate in the referral market approaches its upper bound q2 → a, hence u1 asymptotically
converges to its minimum value cβδ(1 − µ)/[a(1 − β)(y1 − z)− c(r + δ(1− β))].
In the opposite case a lower number of social contacts raises the equilibrium unemployment
of high ability workers u1. So there is a negative impact on the upper bound of the equilibrium
market tightness θ¯(u1). With respect to condition A this means that the difference between the
left hand side and the right hand side is diminishing with a lower number of social contacts l
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(see figure 2). Therefore there exists a threshold value l0 > 0 such that condition A is satisfied
with a strict equality. This automatically implies that the equilibrium with referrals does not
exist for l ≤ l0. These results are summarized in corollary 1:
Corollary 1: For l < l0 there exists a unique search equilibrium without referrals, where the
market tightness θ∗ is given by:
c+ p
q(θ∗)
= (1− β)
(µy0 + (1− µ)y1 − z
r + δ + βλ(θ∗)
)
The threshold number of social contacts l0 is then given by θ
∗ = θ¯(u1(l0)).
Figure 2: Existence of the decentralized equilibrium
Intuitively, if the number of social contacts is low l ≤ l0 it is not profitable for firms to
rely solely on referrals. This means that social contacts are not valuable and wage dispersion is
purely attributed to differences in the productivity: ∆w = β(y1−y0). Moreover, the equilibrium
unemployment is the same for both types of workers: u0/µ = u1/(1 − µ) = δ/(δ + λ(θ
∗)).
4 Social optimum
This section investigates efficiency properties of the decentralized equilibrium. Consider the
problem of a social planner, whose objective is to maximize the present discounted value of
output minus the costs of job creation:
max
θ,v2
∫ ∞
0
e−rt((1− µ− u1)y1 + (µ− u0)y0 + (z − (c+ p)θ)(u0 + u1)− cv2)dt (8)
In addition, the social planner is subject to the same matching constraints as firms and workers,
therefore the dynamics of unemployment is described by the following differential equations
u˙0 = λ(θ)u0 − δ(µ− u0) and u˙1 = (λ(θ) + λ2)u1 − δ(1− µ− u1). The next proposition presents
solution of the planner’s optimization problem.
Proposition 2. Consider a social planner choosing the market tightness θ in the regular market
and the number of vacancies v2 in the referral market. Let φ = (∂m1(u1, v2)/∂u1)·(u1/m1(u1, v2))
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be the elasticity of the matching function m1(u1, v2). Then the optimal job creation is:
c+ p
q(θ)
= (1− η)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1) and
c
q2
= k1 (9)
where the costate variables k0 and k1 (∆k = k0 − k1) are obtained as:
k0 =
y0 − z − λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ)
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
k1 =
y1 − z + λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ + (η − φ)λ2k1
r + δ + ηλ(θ) + ηλ2
Proof: Appendix II.
The costate variables k0 and k1 are the shadow prices of the surplus values S0 and S re-
spectively. Consider first the situation when k0 > k1 which means that high ability workers
create a lower job surplus than low ability workers. This situation is possible since high ability
workers have an additional possibility of employment in the referral market. Hence their outside
opportunities are better and their reservation wages are higher. Therefore, if k0 > k1 every
additional high ability worker searching in the regular market reduces the expected profits of
firms. To see this let J¯ = (1−η)(γk0+(1−γ)k1) be the expected firm profit at the optimum, so
that ∂J¯/∂(1− γ) = −(1− η)(k0 − k1) < 0. This result implies that high ability workers impose
a negative externality on low ability workers in the regular labour market. This conclusion is
similar to the result by Gautier (2002) who shows that unemployment of low-skilled workers
may increase if both high- and low-skilled workers are pooled in the job market for simple jobs.
However, Gautier (2002) does not consider welfare and referrals in his work and so our result
may serve as an extension of his finding.
Next consider the opposite case when k0 < k1 which means that high ability workers are
significantly more productive and create a higher surplus than low ability workers. Then the
external effect is reversed. Every additional high ability worker searching in the regular market
increases the expected profits of firms and so high ability workers impose a positive externality
on low ability workers. From proposition 2 the surplus difference ∆k can be expressed as follows:
∆k =
y0 − y1 + φcθ2
r + δ + λ(θ)
where θ2 =
v2
u1
Therefore ∆k is positive if y1− y0 < cφθ2 and negative otherwise. Intuitively, a lower difference
in productivities and a larger number of social contacts (which increase the market tightness θ2)
make the first case more likely. In contrast, a large productivity difference and a low number of
social contacts contribute to the occurrence of the second case. In addition, the above equation
implies that ∆k > 0 if productivity differences between workers are negligibly small, that is
y0 = y1. This means that high ability workers unambiguously impose a negative externality on
low ability workers in the regular labour market.
Finally, consider the labour market without contacts, so that v2 = 0. For the traditional
Hosios value of the bargaining power (β = η) it is than true that: γk0+(1−γ)k1 = γS0+(1−γ)S,
so the externality is neutralized and the market tightness θ coincides with the optimal choice
of the social planner. If v2 = 0 it follows that ∆k < 0 so more productive high ability workers
unambiguously impose a positive externality on agents with low ability. Nevertheless, in the
equilibrium both externalities offset each other as low ability workers produce less output which
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explains a negative external effect on high ability workers. In a more general framework with
social contacts the two externalities can be internalized by means of an optimal redistribution
policy, which is characterized in the proposition below:
Proposition 3. Let the Hosios condition be satisfied, so that β = η = φ. For l > l0 the
equilibrium with social contacts is inefficient but there exists a policy scheme {τ∗0 , τ
∗
1 , s
∗} that
can restore the optimal allocation:
τ∗0 = λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ) τ
∗
1 = −λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ s
∗ = ηc
Proof: Appendix III.
Next observe that firms in the referral market do not impose a negative externality on other
firms because q2 does not depend on v2. Indeed a new job opening in the referral market does
not change the hiring probability of other firms. Therefore, the optimal job creation in the
referral market is obtained at the point where the total surplus of the job k1 is equal to the
expected cost c/q2. In contrast, in the decentralized economy firms capture a fraction (1−β) of
the total surplus S so the job creation is distorted downwards. The optimal policy then includes
paying employment subsidies s to firms in the referral market. One immediate implication of
this policy should be a lower unemployment of high ability workers u1 and a higher job-finding
rate λ2. The situation is different in the regular market. These firms impose a standard search
externality on other firms which is neutralized for β = η.
Further consider an economy with the optimal employment subsidy s∗. Proposition 3 de-
scribes a system of Pigouvian taxes τ∗0 and τ
∗
1 . When ∆k > 0 high ability workers impose a
negative congestion externality on low ability workers, so the optimal policy implies a negative
value of τ∗1 < 0. These transfers are supposed to reduce the reservation wage of high ability
workers and increase the expected profit J¯ . In a similar way, low ability workers create more
profits and impose a positive congestion externality on high ability workers. So the optimal
policy implies a positive value of τ∗0 > 0, these transfers are supposed to increase the reservation
wage of low ability workers. Finally, note that this policy should increase the wage w0 and
decrease both wages w1 and w2, so a lower equilibrium wage dispersion is a positive side effect
of this policy.
For ∆k < 0, proposition 3 implies τ∗0 < 0 and τ
∗
1 > 0. In this case the bargained wage of
low ability workers is too high and the wage of high ability workers is too low. Wages are then
compressed in the decentralized equilibrium and the planner needs to raise the reservation wage
of high ability workers and reduce the reservation wage of low ability workers. These predictions
coincide with the results of Blazquez and Jansen (2008), however they do not describe the
possibility of the reverse policy when ∆k > 0. Identifying and characterising this latter case is
the primary contribution of this paper.
To complete this section we also compare the minimum number of contacts l0 in the de-
centralized equilibrium and l∗0 in the social optimum. In the equilibrium without referrals the
labour market tightness is equal to θ∗ (see corollary 1) and the corresponding unemployment
of high ability workers is u1 = δ(1 − µ)/(δ + λ(θ
∗)). In this economy opening a vacancy in the
referral market is associated with a present value of profits J2 = (1−β)(y1− z)/(r+ δ+βλ(θ
∗))
and is independent of the number of social contacts l (see figure 3).
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Figure 3: Choice of l0 in the decentralized equilibrium and in the social optimum
In contrast, expected costs from an open referral vacancy are equal to c/q2 which is a decreas-
ing function of l. Intuitively, expected duration of an open vacancy is lower with a larger number
of social links. The threshold value l0 can then be found as a minimum number of contacts with
positive net profits from referral vacancies J2 = c/q2, which is equivalent to θ
∗ = θ¯(u1(l0)):
l0 =
ln
(
a(1− β)(y1 − z)− c(r + δ + βλ(θ
∗))
)
− ln a(1− β)(y1 − z)
lnλ(θ∗)− ln (δ + λ(θ∗))
If the optimal policy is implemented, firms’ expected profits are larger as y1 − τ
∗
1 − z > y1 − z,
while the expected costs are lower (c − s < c). Therefore referral vacancies become attractive
for firms at a lower number of social contacts l∗0 < l0. Therefore, the decentralized decision of
firms not to use referrals may be inefficient from a social perspective.
5 Numerical example
This section parameterizes the model to match the average labour market indicators in the
OECD countries. Without loss of generality, we normalize the productivity parameter y0 to 1.
The productivity of high ability workers y1 is taken to be 1.25 for the benchmark case and we also
consider the cases y1 = 1 (workers differ only in social capital) and y1 = 1.5. For comparison,
Gautier (2002) uses the value of 0.5 for the productivity of the low-skilled workers and 1 for the
high-skilled. In Albrecht and Vroman (2002) productivity values of the high-skilled workers are
set in the interval from 1.25 to 1.6 which is similar to our range.
We choose a unit period of time to be one quarter and set r = 0.012 which corresponds to
the annual discount rate of 5%. Further, we follow Shimer (2005b) and set the flow value of
leisure z equal to 0.4. Fontaine (2008) uses the value of 0.15 for the U.S. economy and 0.4 for
the French economy. Gautier (2002) and Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) set z equal to 0.2. At the
same time, Hall and Milgrom (2008) obtain a larger value of 0.71. Therefore, our choice of z is
in the middle range of values in the literature. We also take δ = 0.1 and η = 0.72 as in Shimer
(2005b). This choice of δ implies an average employment duration of 2.5 years. Shimer (2005b)
obtains these estimates from the monthly US transition data for the period 1960-2004. The
same value of the separation rate is also used in Pissarides (2009).
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The cost of an open referral vacancy c is chosen to be 0.2. Intuitively, this parameter captures
the costs of traveling and accommodation of job applicants at the place of the interview. Also
note that the cost of an open vacancy in the regular market is higher due to the screening
expenses of firms, therefore, we set c + p = 0.4. This exactly coincides with the Cahuc and
Fontaine’s (2009) values of these parameters. Shimer (2005b) has chosen the value of 0.213 for
the cost of vacancies in the regular market while Fontaine (2008) uses the value of 0.3. Next, the
fraction of low-ability workers is set to 60% of the overall population so that µ = 0.6. Albrecht
and Vroman (2002) choose a similar value of 0.67 for the proportion if low-skilled workers in
their model, while Gautier (2002) uses the value of 0.5 for this parameter.
With respect to the bargaining power, we assume β = η = 0.72 to satisfy the Hosios con-
dition. Moreover, we make a similar assumption in the referral market and set φ = η in the
benchmark case where φ is the elasticity of the job-finding rate in the referral market. Com-
bining φ = η with a = 2 and solving equations (9) for l, we find that l∗ = 40. Therefore,
the implied number of professional contacts in a network of high-ability workers is equal to 40.
Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) use l = 50, while Fontaine (2008) uses l = 40 in a benchmark model
of his paper. These numbers are in line with the empirical evidence, for example, in their recent
study Cingano and Rosolia (2008) find that the median number of professional contacts in Italy
is equal to 32. This number is higher in Germany and is equal to 43 according to Glitz (2013).
y0 y1 r δ z η β φ m µ c p a l
1 1.25 0.012 0.1 0.4 0.72 0.72 0.72 1.22 0.6 0.2 0.2 2 40
Table 1: Values of the model parameters
Finally, we set m to 1.22 which is an efficiency multiplier in the Cobb-Douglas matching
function: λ(θ) = mθη. This parameter yields the following equilibrium unemployment rates:
u0/µ = 0.0924 and u1/(1−µ) = 0.0388 for the two groups of workers. So the average unemploy-
ment rate in the economy is equal to 0.07 which is close to the long-term unemployment rate in
the U.S. For comparison, Blazquez and Jansen (2008) set m equal to 1, while Shimer (2005b)
uses the value of 1.355.
5.1 Comparative statics
First, the model shows that it is not profitable for firms to open vacancies in the referral job
market when the number of workers’ contacts is low enough. Numerically solving the system of
equations (JC), (JC2) and λ2 = 0 we can find the threshold value l0 after which firms begin to
create vacancies in the referral job market. In the benchmark case, l0 is approximately equal
to 5 and it is decreasing in y1 or a. Hence when the number of contacts is less than 5 it is not
profitable for firms to use referrals.
In all our simulations the decentralized equilibrium is unique as can be seen from figure 4. The
curve (JC) is decreasing for low values of u1 and then increasing, while (JC2) is parallel to the
θ-axis. It can also be shown that S0 > S which means that firms obtain higher profits in a match
with low ability workers. When u1 is low and increases, the probability of hiring a low ability
worker γ(θ, u1) falls, the average firm profits decrease and so the market tightness θ is reduced.
In contrast, when u1 is already high and increases further, the fall in γ(θ, u1) is dominated by
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the increase in the total surplus value S. Intuitively, a more pronounced unemployment u1 puts
a downward pressure on the reservation wage of high ability workers. This dampens the wage
w1 and leads to a higher profit J1 = (1− β)S.
Figure 4: Left panel: Job creation curves determining the equilibrium values of θ and u1 when
l = 5 (blue), l = 40 (black) and l =∞ (red). Right panel: Job creation curves determining the
equilibrium values of θ and u1 when y1 = 1 (blue), y1 = 1.25 (black) and y1 = 1.5 (red).
What are the implications of a higher productivity y1 for θ (u0) and u1? The model predicts
that both unemployment rates decrease. This result is intuitive as firms expect higher profits and
open more vacancies in both job markets (because high ability workers search in both markets).
Figure 4 (right) illustrates this effect for the benchmark case ∆y = 0.25 and the other two cases
when ∆y = 0 and ∆y = 0.5: (JC2) moves to the left and (JC) to the up-left with the increase
in ∆y. This result is similar to Gautier (2002) where the author finds that low-skilled workers
gain from the increased productivity of high-skilled workers in simple jobs.
What is the impact of the increase in the number of social contacts l on the equilibrium
unemployment? First, the model predicts that a larger number of contacts reduces u1 and raises
u0. This effect is illustrated in figure 4 (left) where the decentralized equilibrium values of u1 and
θ for l = 5, l = 40 and l =∞ are compared. As only (JC2) depends on the number of contacts,
there is a parallel shift of this line to the left (right) with the increase (decrease) in l. The larger
is the number of contacts the smaller is the shift. We can also calculate the asymptotic value of
u1 which is equal to 0.012.
Figure 5: Left panel: Change in u0/µ with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue), y1 = 1.25 (black)
and y1 = 1.5 (red). Right panel: Change in u1/(1 − µ) with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue),
y1 = 1.25 (black) and y1 = 1.5 (red)
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Changes in the unemployment rates u0 and u1 with the increase in the number of contacts
are illustrated in figure 5. For l ≤ 5 there exists a unique equilibrium without referrals and so
the two unemployment rates coincide. However, if the number of social links is more than 5
firms rely on social contacts to fill their open vacancies. The two unemployment rates are than
diverging. On the one hand, as high ability workers are better connected, their equilibrium rate
of unemployment is reduced. On the other hand, there is an adverse effect on the equilibrium
unemployment of low ability workers which is increasing in l. If high ability workers are better
connected, their outside opportunities are improved as finding jobs becomes easier. At the
same time, better outside opportunities strengthen the bargaining position of these workers
and increase their wages in the regular market. Therefore, firms’ profits from regular vacancies
and the number of such vacancies are both reduced. Finally, a lower number of vacancies in
the regular market worsens the bargaining position of low ability workers and reduces their
employment and wages. This latter change is illustrated in figure 6.
Figure 6: Left panel: Change in w0 with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue), y1 = 1.25 (black)
and y1 = 1.5 (red). Right panel: Change in w1 = w2 with the increase in l for y1 = 1 (blue),
y1 = 1.25 (black) and y1 = 1.5 (red)
u0 u1 ∆w l0
∆y ↑ - - + -
l ↑ + - +
a ↑ +/- - + -
Table 2: Comparative statics
Our comparative statics results are summarized in table 2. Overall, the model predicts that
a larger number of social links is associated with a more pronounced wage dispersion between the
two groups of workers and a higher unemployment rate of low ability workers. Such predictions
are compatible with the observed empirical evidence in the U.S. documenting an increase in the
inequality of earnings (see Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008)). This allows us to conclude that a
part of this inequality may be generated by a stronger growth and utilization of social networks
in the U.S. and other countries in the recent decade1.
1For example, there exist labor market policies trying to encourage the establishment or the improvement of
social networks (McClure (2000), OECD (2001)). One of them is Australian Working Together program which
aims at providing people the incentives to stay together with their communities even if they are economically
disadvantaged (OECD (2003)).
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5.2 Optimal policy
This subsection investigates the effect of optimal policy {s, τ0, τ1} on endogenous variables in
the labour market. Consider first the case y1 = y0 = 1 when the productivity of the job is not
sensitive to worker’s ability. The optimal vector of policy instruments is given by: s = 0.144,
τ0 = 0.017, τ1 = −0.160. Table 3 presents the results. For the ease of exposition policy changes
are implemented in two steps: only employment subsidies s = ηc in the referral market and the
final policy. In addition, we introduce two new variables Ω0 and Ω1. These variables denote the
expected income of low- and high-ability workers respectively:
Ω0 = u0(z + τ0) + (µ− u0)w0 Ω1 = u1(z + τ) + (1− µ− u1)w1
where the first term is the flow income of unemployed workers and the second term is the flow
income of the employed. Also note that high ability workers earn the same wage w1 = w2
independent of the search channel.
Optimal policy θ u0/µ u1/1 − µ w0 w1 = w2 Ω0 Ω1
Without policy 0.4432 0.0933 0.0504 0.9768 0.9872 0.5538 0.3830
Only subsidy {s} 0.4527 0.0928 0.0211 0.9769 0.9945 0.5540 0.3928
Final policy {s, τ0, τ1} 0.4475 0.0931 0.0182 0.9775 0.9940 0.5552 0.3921
Table 3: Optimal policy s = 0.144, τ0 = 0.017, τ1 = −0.160 in a labour market with y1 = 1
As expected, employment subsidies s reduce the equilibrium unemployment of high ability
workers u1/1 − µ and raise their wages. The unemployment rate of low ability workers u0/µ
is slightly decreased as a consequence of a higher market tightness θ. This is an outcome of a
lower competition between agents in the regular labour market (lower 1− γ). Overall, one can
conclude that subsidizing referrals is associated with a large welfare gain for high ability workers
(Ω1 is higher) and a minor rise in the welfare of low ability workers (Ω0 is higher).
Table 3 further shows that the optimal transfers τ0 = 0.017 and τ1 = −0.160 internalize
congestion externalities in the regular market. This finding is in contrast to Blazquez and
Jansen (2008) as we find that ∆k > 0 for the chosen parameter values. Firm profits are lower
in a match with high ability workers and so every additional high ability unemployed imposes a
negative externality on workers with low abilities making it more difficult for them to find a job.
Therefore, the optimal tax policy favours low ability workers at the cost of the other group (Ω0
is higher at the second step, while Ω1 is lower). The wage of low (high) ability workers becomes
higher (lower), so the wage inequality is slightly reduced. In addition, observe that this second
policy is purely redistributive as it holds that u0τ0 + u1τ1 = 0. Similar tables for y1 = 1.25 and
1.5 are presented in Appendix IV and confirm our predictions.
As follows from table 3, imposing taxes τ0, τ1 is associated with a welfare gain of 0.2% for
workers without connections. In order to understand whether this amount is significant, let us
discount the approximate net yearly average wage in Germany (2200*12.5=27500 EUR)2 over 50
years with an annual discount rate of 5%. We get an amount of 502000 EUR and, therefore, this
increase in welfare is approximately equivalent to the lump sum transfer of 1000 EUR per worker.
Next consider high ability workers. Although the redistributive tax scheme is associated with a
2Approximate average monthly salary (Statistisches Bundesamt yearly report, 2013), multiplied by 12.5 months
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value loss, the overall increase in the welfare of these workers is about 2.4% which is equivalent
to the lump sum amount of 12000 EUR per worker.
In the next step we investigate the robustness of our results. This can be done by considering
the sign of ∆k = k0 − k1 with a variation in the key parameters y1, l and a. Figure 7 confirms
our theoretical conclusion from section 4 that the case ∆k < 0 is more likely with a higher
difference in productivities and a lower number of social contacts. Every curve on this figure
shows the values of ∆k for l in the range from 5 (lower line) to 14 (higher line) and for y1 taking
values from 1.05 to 1.95. Moreover a = 1 on the left panel of the graph and a = 2 on the right
panel. It is easy to see, therefore, that ∆k is non-negative when a = 2 and y1 ≤ 1.95. Although,
when a = 1, ∆k can become negative for low values of l and a high productivity y1. This is
precisely the case when our result is in line with the finding of Blazquez and Jansen (2008) and
the equilibrium exhibits a wage compression in the regular labour market.
Figure 7: Left panel: Values of ∆k for l = [5...14], y1 = [1.05...1.95] and a = 1. Right panel:
Values of ∆k for l = [5...14], y1 = [1.05...1.95] and a = 2.
Figure 8 compares the threshold number of social contacts in the decentralized economy l0
with the optimal planner’s choice l∗0. In particular, it illustrates our result from section 4 that
l∗0 is always lower than l0 for every a from 1 to 10. Thus, the decentralized decision not to
use referrals may be suboptimal from the social perspective. Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) have
already found in their setting that for low values of β formal search methods can be used instead
of social networks and this allocation can be inefficient. Our paper extends this result in the
sense that it holds for every β and depends on the number of contacts in the networks.
Figure 8: Comparison between l0 (solid) and l
∗
0 (dashed) for a = [1...10].
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6 Conclusion
This paper develops a labour market matching model with heterogeneous workers and two chan-
nels of job search: formal methods and social networks. Entering firms have an option to post
a vacancy in the regular job market or in the referral market, where job information is exclu-
sively transmitted by employees. The paper proves existence of the decentralized equilibrium
in this framework and then shows that this equilibrium is inefficient. There are two reasons
for the inefficiency. First, firms obtain a fixed fraction of the total job surplus in the referral
market which is below the social gain. Therefore, the number of referral vacancies is low and the
equilibrium unemployment of high ability workers is inefficiently high. This inefficiency can be
corrected by means of employment subsidies in the referral market. Second, high ability workers
congest the market for low ability workers. Moreover, this congestion externality is increasing
in the number of social contacts. The optimal policy then includes a positive income transfer
to low ability workers and a negative transfer to high ability workers. This policy reduces the
equilibrium wage dispersion which is different from the result of Blazquez and Jansen (2008)
reporting a compressed equilibrium wage distribution in a similar framework without contacts.
Finally, we examine the effect of a larger number of social contacts. High ability workers
rely strongly on their networks, thus their unemployment falls and their wages rise with a
larger density of the network. In contrast, low ability workers are adversely effected by this
change. Their wages fall and the unemployment rate is increased. Overall, the equilibrium wage
dispersion is increasing in the number of social contacts.
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8 Appendix
Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 1. The right-hand side of equation (JC2) is monotonically
increasing in u1, while the left-hand side of (JC2) is monotonically decreasing in u1:
lim
u1→1−µ
(1− β)(y1 − z)
(r + δ + βδ 1−µ−u1
u1
)
= (1− β)
y1 − z
r + δ
lim
u1→1−µ
c
a[1− (
1− µ− u1
1− µ
)l]
=
c
a
Therefore, (JC2) will determine a unique value of u1 when
c
a
< (1− β)
y1 − z
r + δ
.
Condition A: the left-hand side of condition A is monotonically increasing in θ:
lim
θ→0
c+ p
q(θ)
= 0 lim
θ→θ¯(u1)
c+ p
q(θ)
=
c+ p
q(θ¯(u1))
The right-hand side of this condition is not necessarily monotonic in θ, however:
lim
θ→0
γ(θ, u1)(y0 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
+
(1− γ(θ, u1))(y1 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2
=
µ(y0 − z)
(µ+ u1)(r + δ)
+
u1(y1 − z)
(µ + u1)(r + δ + βλ2)
> 0
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where we use that γ(0, u1) = µ/(µ+ u1) and
lim
θ→θ¯(u1)
γ(θ, u1)(y0 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
+
(1− γ(θ, u1))(y1 − z)
r + δ + βλ(θ) + βλ2
=
µy0 + (1− µ)y1 − z
r + δ + λ(θ¯(u1))
where γ(θ¯(u1)) = µ. Then there exists an equilibrium with θ(u1) < θ¯(u1) if:
(1− β)
y0µ+ y1(1− µ)− z
r + δ + βλ(θ¯(u1))
<
c+ p
q(θ¯(u1))
Wage dispersion ∆w is given by:
∆w = β(y1 − y0) + (1− β)
( β(y1 − z)(1− µ− u1)δ
(r + δ)u1 + β(1− µ− u1)δ
−
β(y0 − z)λ(θ)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
)
Differentiation of ∆w with respect to u1 and θ gives
∂∆w
∂u1
= −(1− β)
β(y1 − z)δ(ru1 + δ(1 − µ))
((r + δ)u1 + β(1− µ− u1)δ)2
< 0
∂∆w
∂λ(θ)
= −(1− β)
β(y0 − z)(r + δ)
(r + δ + βλ(θ))2
> 0
Appendix II: Proof of Proposition 2.
The Hamiltonian for the problem of the social planner:
H = (1− µ− u1)y1 + (µ− u0)y0 + (z − (c+ p)θ)(u0 + u1)− cv2 + k0(λ(θ)u0 − δ(µ − u0))
+ k1(λ(θ)u1 + av2[1− (1−
u1
1− µ
)l]− δ(1 − µ− u1))
where k0, and k1 are costate variables corresponding to u0 and u1 respectively. The optimal
social planner solution must satisfy:
∂H
∂θ
= −(c+ p)(u0 + u1) + λ
′(θ)(k0u0 + k1u1) = 0 ⇒
c+ p
q(θ)
= (1− η)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1)
∂H
∂v2
= −c+ ak1[1− (1−
u1
1− µ
)l] = 0
∂H
∂u0
= −y0 + (z − (c+ p)θ) + k0(λ(θ) + δ) = −rk0
⇒ k0 =
y0 − z + (1− η)λ(θ)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1)
r + δ + λ(θ)
⇒ k0 =
y0 − z − (1− η)λ(θ)(1− γ)∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ)
∂H
∂u1
= −y1 + (z − (c+ p)θ) + k1(λ(θ) +
alv2
1− µ
(1− u1/(1− µ))
l−1 + δ) = −rk1
⇒ k1 =
y1 − z + (1− η)λ(θ)(γk0 + (1− γ)k1)
r + δ + λ(θ) +
alv2
1− µ
(1−
u1
1− µ
)l−1
⇒ k1 =
y1 − z + (1− η)λ(θ)γ∆k
r + δ + ηλ(θ) + φλ2
Appendix III: Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the decentralized economy with a vector
of policy instruments {s = ηc, τ0 = λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ), τ1 = −λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ}:
S0 =
y0 − z − τ0
r + δ + βλ(θ)
=
y0 − z − λ(θ)∆k(1− η)(1 − γ)
r + δ + βλ(θ)
S =
y1 − z − τ1
r + δ + βλ(θ) + φλ2
=
y1 − z + λ(θ)∆k(1− η)γ
r + δ + βλ(θ) + φλ2
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For the case when β = η = φ the free-enrty conditions become:
c+ p
q(θ)
= (1− η)[(1 − γ)S0 + γS] and
c− ηc
q2
= (1− η)S ⇒
c
q2
= S
therefore, it follows that S0 = k0 and S = k1 and the optimal allocation can be implemeted.
Appendix IV: Tables for model parameters after imposing the policy for y1 = 1.25 and y1 = 1.5
Optimal policy θ u0/µ u1/1 − µ w0 w1 = w2 Ω0 Ω1
Without policy 0.4609 0.0924 0.0388 0.9770 1.2359 0.5542 0.4814
Only subsidy {s} 0.4634 0.0923 0.0171 0.9770 1.2437 0.5543 0.4917
Final policy {s, τ0, τ1} 0.4562 0.0926 0.0158 0.9775 1.2433 0.5552 0.4912
Table 4: Optimal policy s = 0.144, τ0 = 0.014, τ1 = −0.124 in a labour market with y1 = 1.25
Optimal policy θ u0/µ u1/1 − µ w0 w1 = w2 Ω0 Ω1
Without policy 0.4722 0.0918 0.0324 0.9772 1.4847 0.5545 0.5798
Only subsidy {s} 0.4702 0.0919 0.0147 0.9771 1.4930 0.5545 0.5908
Final policy {s, τ0, τ1} 0.4623 0.0923 0.0141 0.9775 1.4928 0.5552 0.5905
Table 5: Optimal policy s = 0.144, τ0 = 0.012, τ1 = −0.084 in a labour market with y1 = 1.5
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